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The Persistent Objector Doctrine: Identifying
Contradictions
Shelly Aviv Yeini

Abstract
The persistent objector doctrine (POD) in international law provides that a rule of
customary international law (CIL) will not oblige a state that has persistently objected to the
development of the rule. The doctrine requires that the objection be “persistent” and “consistent”
and that it not be contradictory. Yet, while in this context the meaning of persistency and
consistency, in this context, has been discussed in the legal literature, the term “contradiction”
has not. Therefore, it is not clear what type of behavior would represent a contradiction that would
disqualify a state from persistent objector (PO) status. In practice, this indeterminacy leads to a
too wide understanding of the term, undermining the possibility of PO status altogether.
This Article offers a novel understanding of “contradiction”: it suggests that while
substantive contradictions should negate a state’s PO status, not all contradicting behaviors
should count as such. As this Article argues, the current understanding of contradiction is flawed
because it does not always require a logical correlation between objection and contradiction. This
encourages states to radicalize their positions in order to achieve PO status, while making it
virtually impossible to successfully achieve such status.
Therefore, this Article suggests guidelines to differentiate valid, objection-maintaining
behavior within the POD framework from actual contradictions. The proper understanding of
POD contradictions should require logical relations of contradiction between the behavior and the
previous objection. The contradiction must include an acknowledgment that the statement reflects
the state’s position. The assessment of the contradiction must be done in a genuine manner and
not invoked merely as a means of enforcing CIL rules on an objecting state.
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I. I NTRODU C TIO N
The persistent objector doctrine (POD) provides that if a state “persistently
and consistently objects to a newly emerging norm of customary international law
during the period of the ‘formation’ of that norm . . . the objecting state is exempt
from the customary norm in question once it has crystallized and for so long as
the objection is maintained.”1 POD, however, does not apply to jus cogens norms
even if the requirements for POD are met, as no derogations are permitted from
peremptory norms.2 POD is based on freedom of choice and diversity in
international law. It enshrines the idea of states’ consent to take on international
obligations, but consequently compromises universal conformity with CIL
norms.3
Despite some criticism of POD—mainly that it favors the interests of the
Global North4 and that it lacks practical utility5—the persistent objector (PO) rule
is “undeniably part of the language of modern international law”6 and is “firmly
1

2

3

4

5

6

JAMES A. GREEN, THE PERSISTENT OBJECTOR RULE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2016). For other
variations of POD definition, see Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
529, 538 (1993) (“[I]f a state objects to the establishment of a norm while it is becoming law and
persistently objects up to the present, it is exempt from that norm.”); Holning Lau, Rethinking the
Persistent Objector Doctrine in International Human Rights Law, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 495, 495 (2005) (“[I]f a
state persistently objects to the development of a customary international law, it cannot be held to
that law when the custom ripens.”).
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 191 (describing the notion of “peremptory norms trump the persistent
objector rule” as a “majority view”); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 213 (2010) (“Jus cogens norms cannot be overridden, even by treaty, and
there is no right to opt out of them by prior persistent objection.”); Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities
Of and For Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 121, 132–34 (2010) (discussing the
inapplicability of POD to jus cogens norms).
BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS 229 (2010):
Because of the value attached by fundamental ethical principles to the
overall freedom of action of states and respect for diversity, if a state so
strongly believes that an emerging rule of customary law is not desirable to
recognize that it repeatedly objects to it, the value of respecting that state’s
wishes should often – but not always – be considered to outweigh the
community values that would be served by obligating the state to adhere
to the rule.
See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 24
(2018) (“The rule of persistent objector was developed to safeguard the concerns of western
capitalist powers after the beginning of the Cold War.”).
J.H.H. Weiler, Editorial, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L.1, 3 (2013) (noting that POD is a “theoretically interesting
but practically almost irrelevant doctrine.”); Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Erik Voeten, Precedent,
Compliance and Change in Customary International Law: An Explanatory Theory, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 389,
429 (2014) (“[T]hough lawyers may value the persistent objector doctrine as a rhetorical resource
and for its theoretical role in reconciling CIL formation with state consent, the doctrine is, in fact,
of limited practical significance.”).
GREEN, supra note 1, at 4.
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established in the orthodox doctrine on the sources of international law.”7
Nevertheless, the application of POD is still somewhat vague. While the topic of
how frequently an objection should be made has received some scholarly
attention,8 the question as to what behavior constitutes a contradiction to an objection, thus
preventing a state from receiving a PO status, has not. Legal authorities have not
suggested thus far what conduct exactly will contradict a state’s objection.
Imagine the following situation: the state of Arcadia has persistently objected
to the rule of CIL prohibiting the use of crossbows in armed conflict. However,
after years of establishing its status as a PO, Arcadia’s ambassador in Utopia states
in an interview that the use of crossbows in armed conflict is indeed prohibited.
Does such a statement by the ambassador disqualify Arcadia from maintaining its
PO status? Would the answer be different if such a statement were carried out by
Arcadia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs or by a Supreme Court judgment? Would a
refusal by military authorities to use crossbows on the battlefield constitute a
contradiction to Arcadia’s objection? The proposed research aims to establish
what practices and statements can be regarded as contradictions to a persistent
objection that thereby disqualify a state from holding a PO status regarding a rule
of CIL.
This Article proceeds as follows: Section II describes the development of
POD and its early and modern sources. Section III describes the current
understanding of POD and its requirements. It analyzes the temporal, persistency,
and consistency requirements of POD. The main focus of this Section is that
consistency, as a contradiction, is a form of inconsistency. Section IV catalogs the
forms of state behavior (both practice and statements) that have been claimed to
form a contradiction to the persistent objections of states, thus constituting
inconsistency, and consequently disqualifying such states from a PO status.
Finally, Section V offers a new understanding of which behaviors constitute
contradictions and which should be facilitated within the framework of the POD
without impairing PO status.

II. T HE P E RSISTE NT O BJE C TOR D OC TRINE
The Section below will provide an overview of the early development of
POD and of its modern understanding. While there are notable differences
between the early version of the doctrine and the modern version, understanding
POD’s modern manifestation requires understanding its early theoretical
7

8

Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 457, 463 (1985).
See David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 957, 967 (1986);
Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of Persistent Objector Revisited, 59 INT’L &
COMPAR. L. Q. 779, 781 (2010) (“A State is also required to actively, unambiguously and consistently
maintain such an objection.”).
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underpinning. Furthermore, a careful reading of POD’s history and an
understanding of its origin counters some misconceptions of POD as a “new”
doctrine lacking roots in international law.9

A. Early Sources of POD
When Ian Brownlie coined the term “persistent objector” in his 1966
masterpiece, “Principles of Public International Law,” he described POD as
somewhat of a given fact in international law but did not support his endorsement
of POD with legal authorities.10 However, the doctrine itself has been a part of
international law since long before the 1960s.
The International Law Association (ILA)11 described Cornelius van
Bynkershoek’s 1721 work as an example of the acceptance of POD as early as the
eighteenth century.12 Bynkershoek argued that a dissenting state may be exempt
from a rule of CIL by expressing its will not to be bound by it:
Can a nation abolish the immunities of ambassadors, which they are enjoying
in accordance with the common law of the nations? . . . [I]t can if it makes a
public announcement in regard to them, because these immunities owe such
validity as they have not to any law but only to a tacit presumption. One
nation does not bind another, and not even a consensus of all nations except
one binds that one, isolated though it be, if it is independent and has decreed
to use other laws . . . The law of nations is nothing but a presumption based
on custom, nor has this presumption any validity in the face of a definitely
expressed wish on the part of him who is concerned. 13

James A. Green, a professor of public international law at the University of
Reading who has conducted some of the most prominent research regarding POD
in recent years, revealed two additional sources from the eighteenth century that
may be used as evidence of early incarnations of POD.14 The first source is Emer
de Vattel’s 1758 book, in which he argued that:
9

See, e.g., Chimni, supra note 4, at 6, 23 (describing POD as a new “invention” of “recent origin”).

10

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1966). See also Bradley & Gulati,
supra note 2, at 236.
ILA is a nonprofit organization founded in 1873. About Us, INT’L L. ASS’N, h
https://perma.cc/VD5Q-W4LB. Its objectives include promoting “the study, clarification and
development of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international
understanding and respect for international law.” See ILA CONSTITUTION, art. 3.1(2016),
https://perma.cc/S6EA-JC7Q.

11

12

13

14

COMMITTEE ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INTERNATIONAL LAW, FINAL REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, LONDON CONFERENCE
27 n.68 (2000), https://perma.cc/2F3H-KV8Q.
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 24–25 (citing CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE FORO LEGATORUM
LIBER SINGULARIS: A MONOGRAPH ON THE JURISDICTION OVER AMBASSADORS IN BOTH CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL CASES, 106–07 (G.J. Laing trans., 2d ed. 1744) (1721)).
GREEN, supra note 1, at 25.
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When a custom or usage is generally established . . . between all the civilized
nations in the world . . . it becomes obligatory on all the nations in question,
who are considered as having giving their consent to it, and are bound to
observe it towards each other, as long as they have not expressly declared their
resolution of not observing it in future.15

The second source indicating the existence of an eighteenth-century version
of the POD is Georg Friedrich von Martens’ contention from 1788:
As to rights founded on simple custom, each power may discontinue them
whenever it makes a timely declaration, either express or tacit, of its intention
so to do. Such rights may also cease by giving place to others, established by
the mutual will of the nations concerned: but this change made by some
powers cannot oblige other powers to change their conduct. 16

Green concluded that, while the sources above do resemble what we
recognize today as POD, they lack POD’s modern requirements of persistence,
consistency, and at least in the cases of Bynkershoek and Vattel, timeliness.17
Therefore, “[i]t is ultimately something of a stretch to identify the persistent
objector rule per se in the eighteenth-century writings of scholars such as
Bynkershoek, Vattel, or Martens; these theorists did not endorse the rule as we
know it.”18 However, this author’s opinion is that it was expected that a legal
doctrine would develop over the years. Therefore, it is reasonable to find that
eighteenth-century POD differs somewhat from modern POD.
In the nineteenth century, POD transitioned from being relegated to the
theoretical musings of legal scholars to becoming an actual legal practice. In the
1817 case of Le Louis, Senior Judge in the High Court of Admiralty Sir William
Scott indirectly considered whether international law obliged France to prohibit
the slave trade.19 Scott concluded that while the practice had been abolished in
some other states, like Britain, such a rule did not apply to France as it had
“rejected any such prohibition.”20
15

16

See GREEN, supra note 1, at 25 (citing EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS lxv,
¶ 26 (Joseph Chitty ed., 6th ed. 1844) (1758)).
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 25–26 (citing G.F. VON MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF
NATIONS, FOUNDED ON THE TREATIES AND CUSTOMS OF THE MODERN NATIONS OF EUROPE 356
(W. Cobbett trans., 1802) (1788)).

17

GREEN, supra note 1, at 25–26.

18

Id. at 26.
See Tara Helfman, The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone and the Abolition of the West African Slave
Trade, 115 YALE L.J. 1122, 1150–51 (2006) (describing Sir William Scott’s holding that “no state
could claim the right to interrupt foreign navigation,” which “dealt a deathblow to Thorpe’s efforts
to impose a unilateral international ban on the West African slave trade.”). See also GREEN, supra
note 1, at 27.
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 25–26 (citing JOHN DODSON, A REPORT OF THE CASE OF THE LOUIS,
FOREST, MASTER, 1817, APPEALED FROM THE VICE ADMIRALTY COURT AT SIERRA LEONE, AND
DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY 48–52 (London, J. Butterworth & Sons 1817)).

19

20
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The 1825 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in The Antelope21 has also been
considered by some writers to reflect the notion of POD.22 The Antelope case
required the Court to determine whether the seizure of a Spanish slaving vessel
by U.S. privateers was lawful.23 Justice Marshall established that, while slave
trading is against the law of nature, states that had not accepted the law of nations
prohibition on slave trading did not violate such a law by trading in slaves.24 Green
observed that Justice Marshall focused on the lack of acceptance of the rule
prohibiting the slave trade rather than on its rejection and objection, thus making
The Antelope another imperfect example of POD.25 Indeed, POD's rationale seems
to exist in The Antelope even if its construction differs from the modern
understanding of POD.
In the Supreme Court’s famous 1900 case The Paquete Habana, the Court
established that CIL applied to the U.S. “where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.”26 Curtis A. Bradley and
Mitu Gulati offer that “a possible explanation for this qualifying language in The
Paquete Habana is that the Court viewed the CIL rule in question as binding on the
United States only to the extent that the country had not opted out of it.”27
Green found another potential early use of POD in the 1903 Fischbach and
Friedricy Cases reviewed before the Mixed Claims Commission (GermanyVenezuela).28 The Commission was established primarily to consider German
claims originating from foreign debts and damages suffered during the
Venezuelan civil wars of 1898 to 1900.29 In particular, the Commission considered
whether international law holds states responsible for seizure by revolutionary
21
22

23
24

25
26
27

28

29

23 U.S. 66 (1825).
FRANCISCO FORREST MARTIN, THE CONSTITUTION AS TREATY: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
CONSTRUCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE US CONSTITUTION 76 (2007) (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court
in The Antelope appears to have recognized the Rule [POD]”); Maurice H. Mendelson, THE
FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 232–33 (1998) (offering The Antelope case as an
example for POD endorsement).
The Antelope, 23 U.S. at 123. See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 28.
See id. at 120–21:
That [the slave trade] is contrary to the law of nature will scarely be denied. . . .
Throughout Christendom, this harsh rule has been exploded, and war is no
longer considered as giving a right to enslave captives. But this triumph of
humanity has not been universal. The parties to the modern law of nations do
not propagate their principles by force; and Africa has not yet adopted them.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 28.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
Bradley & Gulati, supra note 2, at 224. It is important to note that Bradley and Gulati admitted that
this was not the common understanding of such a quotation, which has usually been understood
to imply that “domestic institutions . . . can violate CIL on behalf of the United States.” Id.
Fischbach and Friedericy Cases, (Ger. v. Venez.), 10 RIAA 357 (Mixed Claim Comm. 1903);
GREEN, supra note 1, at 29.
Fischbach and Friedericy Cases, 10 RIAA at 359.
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forces. Umpire Duffield asserted that “[a]ny nation has the power and the right to
dissent from a rule or principle of international law, even though it is accepted by
all the other nations.”30 However, Duffield eventually concluded that, in the case
at hand, Venezuela could not exempt itself from the CIL rule in question because
Venezuela had previously accepted responsibility over the revolutionaries.31
Therefore, Green argued that “the decision provides, at most, limited support for
the persistent objector rule.”32
The examples provided above suggest that some version of POD, or more
accurately, the idea behind POD (that a state may opt out of CIL rules) has existed
for some time in public international law. While the definition of POD suggested
by the examples is not identical to that which exists in modern international law,
these early examples demonstrate the roots of POD, which would later develop
into POD as it is recognized today.33

B. The Asylum and the Fisheries Cases
Modern POD manifested only after World War II.34 Two major cases
established the status of POD in modern international law: the Asylum35 and the
Fisheries36 cases of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Whether one considers
POD’s roots to extend earlier than the Asylum and the Fisheries cases, or takes these
cases to mark the beginning of the POD, it cannot be denied that the ICJ has
shaped the modern conception of the POD.

1. The Asylum Case
The Asylum case concerned the granting of political asylum to Víctor Raúl
Haya de la Torre, a Peruvian opposition leader. Peru issued an arrest warrant
against Haya de la Torre “in respect of the crime of military rebellion.”37 In January
1949, “Haya de la Torre sought asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima.”38
Colombia argued that it was entitled to grant Haya de la Torre asylum as a political
offender39 and that consequently Peru must facilitate the safe departure of Haya

38

Id. at 397.
See id. at 397–98. See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 29.
Id. at 30.
See id. at 33 (“[W]hile the ‘roots’ of the persistent objector rule can be traced back well before 1945,
there is insufficient evidence to assert that the rule in its modern incarnation had emerged prior to
the Second World War.”).
Id.
Asylum (Colom. v Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 266.
Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 272.
Id. at 273.

39

Id. at 273–76.

30
31
32
33

34
35
36
37
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de la Torre from Peru.40 Colombia based its argument on international treaties,
including the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911 and the Havana Convention on
Asylum of 1928, as well as on “regional or local custom peculiar to LatinAmerican States.”41 Peru opposed this position, contending that Haya de la Torre
committed common crimes and thus was not entitled to asylum as a political
offender.42 Furthermore, Peru argued that Colombia did not properly establish the
existence of a regional American custom binding the states.43
Colombia’s submissions were rejected by the ICJ. In its decision, the court
referred to the lack of a treaty law basis for such a determination44 and to CIL.45
Most importantly for the understanding of POD, the ICJ opined:
The Court cannot therefore find that the Colombian Government has proved
the existence of such a custom. But even if it could be supposed that such a
custom existed between certain Latin-American States only, it could not be
invoked against Peru which, far from having by its attitude adhered to it, has,
on the contrary, repudiated it by refraining from ratifying the Montevideo
Conventions of 1933 and 1939, which were the first to include a rule
concerning the qualification of the offence in matters of diplomatic asylum.46

This quotation suggests that if there were a CIL rule regarding asylum, Peru
chose to opt out of it. This statement is commonly considered a milestone
regarding the acknowledgment of POD.47

2. The Fisheries Case
In the Fisheries case of 1951, the ICJ was required to determine whether
Norway’s method for the baseline delimitation of its territorial sea was compatible
with its international law obligations.48 The applicant, the U.K., was aggrieved by
the Norwegian delimitation method because “a considerable number of British
trawlers were arrested and condemned” by Norwegian fishery patrol vessels.49 The
U.K. argued that Norwegian baselines were in violation of CIL with regard to the
customary “ten-mile rule,” which provides that the length of baselines drawn
40
41
42

43

Id. at 271.
Id. at 274–276.
Counter-Memorial Submitted by the Government of the Republic of Peru, Asylum (Colom. v.
Peru), 1950 I.C.J. Pleadings 154 (Mar. 21).
Id. at 118.

48

Asylum, 1950 I.C.J. at 274–76 (establishing that neither the Bolivarian Agreement of 1911, nor the
Havana Convention on asylum, nor the Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum, supported
Columbia’s argument).
Id. at 276–77.
Id. at 277–78.
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 25 (“This unquestionably vague statement is commonly referenced as
the first invocation by the ICJ of the persistent objector rule.”).
Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 120–23.

49

Id. at 125.

44

45
46
47
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across a bay should not be longer than ten nautical miles.50 The ICJ determined
that the ten-mile rule had not yet crystalized into a binding rule of CIL:
[A]lthough the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain States both in their
national law and in their treaties and conventions, and although certain
arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other States have
adopted a different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the
authority of a general rule of international law. 51

Then, the ICJ concluded that even if it had considered the ten-mile rule as
CIL, Norway would have been exempt from it: “In any event the ten-mile rule
would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.”52
It is important to note that a minority of authors have considered such
sources insufficient.53 For example, Patrick Dumberry argues that “[t]he only ICJ
decision that ever dealt with the question of persistent objector in the context of
‘general’ customary law is the Fisheries Case.” 54 He considers the Asylum case to be
irrelevant since it deals with a regional custom.55 The relevant quotation in the
Fisheries case, he provides, is “a mere obiter dictum; the Court had already decided
to reject the existence of any customary rule on other grounds.”56 Holning Lau
has similarly noted that “in both cases, the ICJ’s recognition of the persistent
objector doctrine was purely dictum and the ICJ had resolved the disputes on
other grounds.”57
Despite such remarks, both the Asylum and the Fisheries cases are considered
leading authorities regarding POD validity, as “the majority of writers on
persistent objection have regularly cited the Fisheries and Asylum cases over the last
sixty-plus years to evidence the rule.”58

C. POD’s Rationale
Traditionally, POD has been linked with the voluntarist theory of
international law. This account defines international law as “a system of equal and
50

51
52

See id. at 131 (“[The] United Kingdom Government still maintains on this point that the length of
straight lines must not exceed ten miles.”). See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 36.
Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 131.
Id.

57

GREEN, supra note 1, at 37 (“a (vocal) minority of scholars have questioned the extent to which
these cases provide any genuine support for [POD]”).
Patrick Dumberry, The Last Citadel! Can a State Claim the Status of Persistent Objector to Prevent the
Application of a Rule of Customary International Law in Investor-State Arbitration?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
379, 387 (2010).
Id.
Id.
Lau, supra note 1, at 500.

58

GREEN, supra note 1, at 37.

53

54

55
56
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sovereign states whose actions are limited only by rules freely accepted as legally
binding.”59 Where CIL is concerned, voluntarism assumes that silence implies
consent.60 Therefore, POD, which allows states to opt out of CIL rules they did
not consent to take upon themselves, has been described as “the clearest, most
firmly established, expression of voluntarist conception of obligation in the
accepted doctrine of sources.”61 Indeed, POD is linked with voluntarism and
“constitutes the acid test of custom’s voluntarist nature.”62
However, the theory of voluntarism has since been challenged by the
communitarian theory. H.C.M. Charlesworth explains that the communitarian
approach provides that international law is binding not due to consent, but rather
due to the greater good that it provides to the international community:
The expansion of the international community to include a great number of
states and international organisations, and recognition of the applicability of
international law to individuals and groups within states, has allowed the
purely voluntarist account of international law to be challenged by one based
on communal interests, solidarity and idealism. On this “new” view
international law binds because it is necessary for stability and communication
in the international community. 63

While the voluntarist approach has not disappeared from legal thought and
still holds “considerable influence and imaginative power,”64 even the greatest
supporters of voluntarism admit that in practice there is at least some shift towards
the communitarian approach:
For the past several years, the degree of generality required of a practice, to
enable it to serve as the basis of a customary rule, has been steadily
diminished, while, on the contrary, the binding character of such a rule once
formed is being conceived of as increasingly general in scope. The result is a

59

60

61
62
63

64

Shelton, supra note 2, at 299. For an expression of the voluntarist approach in the Nicaragua case,
maintaining that “in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted
by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception,” see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 269
(June 27).
See John O. McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 7, 9 (2006) (“[N]ations do not have to assent affirmatively to the creation of a principle
of customary international law. Instead, nations are considered to have consented to a principle if
they simply failed to object.”). See also Samantha Besson, State Consent and Disagreement in International
Law-Making, 29 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 289, 295 (2016) (“In international law, like in domestic law and
politics, consent can be express, as in the signature or ratification of a treaty, but also tacit, as in the
absence of objection to a reservation or to a custom in the making.”).
Stein, supra note 7, at 470.
Prosper Weil, Toward Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 433–434.
H. C. M. Charlesworth, Customary International Law and the Nicaragua Case, 11 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 1,
2–3 (1991).
Id. at 3.
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danger of imposing more and more customary rules on more and more states,
even against their clearly expressed will.65

However, even if a shift towards communitarianism is present, that does not
mean that states have relinquished the principle of consent. Such contestation of
approaches might affect POD’s legitimacy. While POD’s rationale is very clear
through the lens of voluntarism, it makes less sense through the communitarian
lens. Indeed, POD offers a rationale that is contrasted with that of
communitarianism—it allows the individual state to put its interests above those
of the global community.
Green offers that instead of trying to match the rationale of POD to either
approach, the advantages of POD should be considered on their own merits. 66
Green describes the advantages and qualities of POD to provide the following
account of POD:67 (1) it “spreads the costs of situations of minority opposition
to emerging norms between the objector and the wider community”;68 (2) it allows
objecting states a sense of security from changes in CIL they oppose; 69 (3) it
reduces “the risks of violation, disengagement, or escalation” by powerful states
objecting to a rule, as it gives them a legal outlet to object rather than to violate
such a rule;70 (4) it gives objecting states time to adjust to the new emerging rule
of CIL;71 (5) it is a negotiation tool that can facilitate or slow customary
international law development;72 (6) it provides predictability to CIL development
as it shines light on the potential emergence of a new rule;73 (7) it improves the
“scrutiny and quality” of CIL norms;74 and (8) it can be used as a face-saving
mechanism to maintain a sense of autonomy.75
Not all of the advantages Green offers are equally convincing, but they all
have some merit. This author finds that the third and fifth advantages (that POD
reduces risks of CIL violation and supports CIL development) are the most
convincing.

67

Weil, supra note 62.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 272 (“[T]he persistent objector rule must be assessed, not in relation to
sweeping theoretical claims, but in relation to its functional benefits, both to the objector and to
the international legal system.”).
Id. at 258–72.

68

Id. at 258.

69

74

Id. at 261.
Id. at 261–64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265–68.
Id. at 268–69.
Id. at 269–71.
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Id. at 271–72.
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On the third advantage (POD reduces risks of CIL violation), powerful
states “may well simply violate a new norm to which they are strongly opposed
once it has emerged.”76 Powerful states bluntly violating CIL is not just damaging
with regard to the rule in question but also with regard to the entire project of
CIL. POD provides a legal mechanism to deal with an objection to a rule without
upsetting the entire apple cart. However, Dumberry offers that the very existence
of POD undermines CIL because “[i]f dissention is allowed, it simply means that
the rule is not custom. There is no possible middle ground.”77 Such a
counterargument seems to avoid the difference between POD and the specially
affected states doctrine (SASD), which provides that “[i]f several ‘States whose
interests are specially affected’ object to the formation of a custom, no custom
can emerge.”78 If a dissention under POD would prevent a rule from crystalizing
into a custom, then SASD would be completely redundant. This is so because:
While a “normal” persistent objector would exclude the custom from
applying to the objector alone, the absence of rule-affirming practice by
specially-affected states (including those specially-affected states that may
object to practice of other states affirming the rule) would prevent the
putative rule from crystalizing into a custom at all, so that the putative rule
would bind neither the objectors nor other states. 79

Via the fifth advantage (POD improving CIL development), POD promotes
the development of CIL by allowing states that endorse a rule of CIL to move on
“without having to wait for the slowest vessel.”80 Indeed, POD allows an objecting
state to put less effort into the prevention of the overall emergence of a norm if
that state knows it can be exempt from its application.81
One could argue that even if one endorses the communitarian approach, the
requirements of POD are exceedingly difficult to meet, and thus it does not
undermine communitarianism in an unbearable manner. It might actually facilitate
communitarianism as states would be more willing to see the global good as
obliging if they have a dissenting option in some circumstances.

76
77

Id. at 261.
Dumberry, supra note 8, at 800.

78

Yoram Dinstein, The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study, 82 INT’L L. STUD. SER.
US NAVAL WAR COL. 99, 109 (2006).

79

Shelly Aviv Yeini, The Specially-Affecting States Doctrine, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 244–45 (2018).
GREEN, supra note 1, at 265 (citing COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GENERAL) INT’L L.,
INT’L L. ASS’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO
THE
FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2000),
https://perma.cc/ZS8N-Z8MF).
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 265. This assumption is not overwhelming, as due to the onerous
requirements of POD there is still a great incentive to lobby against the emergence of an undesired
emerging norm; however, the possibility of POD may somewhat lessen such interest.
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III. POD R E QU IRE ME NTS AND THE P ROBLE M OF
C ONSISTE NC Y
For a state to receive PO status, its objection must satisfy three requirements:
a temporal requirement,82 a persistency requirement,83 and a consistency
requirement.84 The temporal requirement and the persistency requirement are
quite clear, and there is relative agreement within academia regarding their
application.85 The consistency requirement, on the other hand, is at the crux of
the literature gap when it comes to POD. The requirement for consistency is the
most important aspect of POD for the purposes of this Article. The concern here
with breaching an objection may also be described as dealing with inconsistency.
As will be described, the consistency requirement has been analyzed by legal
authorities in a binary manner—a state has either been consistent or
inconsistent—without considering which statements or deeds, by which
authorities, count for such purpose.

A. The Temporal Requirement
The temporal requirement of POD provides that a “[s]tate which objects to
an evolving rule of general customary international law can be exempted from its
obligations.”86 To receive PO status, the objection must be made “during the
process of the rule’s emergence,” rather than after such a rule has been recognized
as a rule of CIL.87 Once a rule has crystallized into CIL, “objection will no longer
avail a state wishing to exempt itself from the law in question.”88 Such late
objections are called “subsequent objections,” and subsequent objectors are not
exempted from the applicability of the rule to which they object.89 Michael
Akehurst, a leading British international law scholar, offers an alternative
approach: the temporal requirement includes the early stages of a rule (after its
crystallization as CIL) so that POD applies if a state “opposes the rule in the early
days of the rule’s existence (or formation) and maintains its opposition
consistently thereafter.”90 While the general opinion is that subsequent objections
82

83

See Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law,
56 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1985).
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 91.

89

See Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical
Framework, 2 U. C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 147, 151 (1996).
See Section III.A. and III.B.
See Charney, supra note 82, at 2.
Stein, supra note 7, at 458.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 137.
Id.

90

Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 24 (1975).

84
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do not allow for an exemption, it should be noted that such objections may
nevertheless affect the development of a rule because “custom is necessarily
altered by states adopting an attitude apart and indeed, at least initially, by states
violating the existing law.”91 Additionally, determining the exact time of
crystallization of CIL rules may prove to be difficult in some cases, and therefore
it is problematic to determine whether an objection has taken place during
crystallization or at the early stages of the rule’s existence.
The roots of the temporal requirement may be attributed (by means of
expansive interpretation) to the ICJ in the Fisheries case, as the court established
that Norway had “always oppose[d]” the ten-mile rule.92 The temporal
requirement was further discussed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases, as Judge ad hoc Sørensen stated in his dissenting opinion that the Federal
Republic of Germany did not object to the principle of equidistance “[a]t a
decisive stage of the formative process,” and thus, could not be considered a PO.93
In the 2002 Domingues decision, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights provided that “[o]nce established, a norm of international customary law
binds all states with the exception of only those states that have persistently
rejected the practice prior to its becoming law.”94 The temporal requirement of POD
was also recognized in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, which established that “a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while
the law is still in the process of development is not bound by that rule even after
it matures.”95
The temporal requirement proves to be especially problematic for new
countries. This is because new countries are bound by the existing rules of CIL,
despite being denied a chance to object to these rules.96
91
92
93

94

95

96

GREEN, supra note 1, at 138.
Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 131. See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 138–39.
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 242, 248 (dissenting opinion
of Judge Sørensen). Though dissenting, Judge Sørensen’s opinion still bears some weight. See
SARMIENTO LAMUS, THE PROLIFERATION OF DISSENTING OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO DISSENT AT THE ICJ AND IACTHR,
4 (2020), https://perma.cc/NU4J-LXZT (“[T]he dissenting opinion [ ] constitutes an important
tool for the development of the law.”).
Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02,
OEA/Serv.L./V/II.1117, doc. 70 rev. 2 ¶ 48 (2002) (emphasis added). See also GREEN, supra note
1, at 138–39.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. d
(AM. L. INST. 1987) [hereinafter Restatement].
See Allen Buchanan, The Legitimacy of International Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
79, 92 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010) (pointing out that “CIL norms apply to
states that did not exist at the time of their emergence”); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 199 (2008) (asserting that “[u]nder
current doctrine, new states are bound by existing rules of CIL.”).
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Even for existing states, the temporal requirement might pose some
difficulties, as it could be “difficult to fix the precise date at which any customary
law norm is established. Thus, the ability of a state to object in a timely manner is
limited.”97 Indeed, some debate might take place as to whether a rule has
crystalized into CIL at the time of an objection. Akehurst’s proposition, which
includes the early stages of an existing CIL rule, seems to offer a solution to such
a problem.98 Controversy is more likely to take place in the earlier stages, rather
than long after a rule has been recognized as CIL.

B. The Persistency Requirement
As can be expected given the name of POD, persistency is a key requirement
for the establishment of a PO. “Obviously, the word ‘persistence’ indicates the
need for a degree of repetition to a state’s objection”—a key element of the
persistent objector rule.99The vast majority of writers consider the requirement of
persistency—that is, of repeating a state’s objection—to be a central part of
POD.100 However, Jonathan Charney, a preeminent expert on international law,
observed that there is “a difference of opinion as to whether the objection must
be persistent.”101 Charney’s implication that the requirement of repetition is under
debate has been referred to as “something of an exaggeration,”102 since “there is
no longer any debate in doctrine (if, indeed, there ever was) as to whether
objection must be persistent.”103 The strongest support for a single objection may
be derived by negation from the text of the U.S. Restatement (Third), which does
not mention the requirement for repetition.104 However, “this element of the rule
[repetition] has not been explicitly rejected: it simply has not been noted.”105
Given the relative agreement on the existence of a persistence requirement,
the real question is just how persistent a PO should be, or more precisely, how
often an objection should be repeated. While it is widely accepted that an

104

Charney, supra note 1, at 538.
See Akehurst, supra note 90, at 24.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 91.
See e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 859,
875 (2006) (“The ‘persistent objector’ exception exempts from a CIL norm nations who, in the
period before the custom ‘matures’ into law, repeatedly and vocally made their opposition
known.”); Charney, supra note 1, at 539 (“The objection must be persistent and must run to the
present.”); Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 166
(2005) (“[T]he persistent objector doctrine puts such a significant burden on the objector not only
to demonstrate its lack of consent, but to do so repeatedly and during the emergence of the rule.”).
Charney, supra note 82, at 3 n.8.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 91.
Id. at 92.
See Restatement, supra note 95.
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GREEN, supra note 1, at 91.
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objection should be persistent, the actual substance of “persistency” remains very
unclear.106
According to David Colson, then an assistant legal adviser for the U.S. State
Department, the answer to this question varies in accordance with the situation at
hand. He explains that “not every legal action needs an equal and opposite reaction
to maintain one’s place in the legal cosmos.”107 Colson further argues that “the
more isolated a State becomes in its legal perspective, the more active it must be
in restating and making clear its position.”108 Colson’s theory provides that in
traditional PO situations, wherein a state finds itself quite isolated in its position,
“it seems apparent that the objector needs to be especially vigilant in protecting
its legal position.”109 However, on special occasions, when there is an interest of
the international community in solving a specific dispute peacefully, “[r]estraint in
legal statement and actions, intended to encourage negotiation, should not be
penalized by international law.”110 In cases in which the number of states
supporting and objecting to a rule is more balanced, the objection may be less
aggressive.111 Finally, in a situation in which a state aims to discourage a change in
a stable legal situation, the state “may find it desirable to state its position
emphatically through deeds. In doing so, it not only protects its legal position in
regard to the State making the new claim, but it serves notice to other States that
it will strongly resist any change in customary legal relationships.”112
Brian Lepard, a professor of law at Nebraska College of Law, similarly
asserted that the level of persistence varies according to context, but without
dividing those levels of persistence into categories:
[I]t is not possible to assert that objection . . . must manifest a certain level of
intensity in every case. Depending on the beliefs of the generality of states an
objection may not even need to be ‘persistent,’ so that the very term
‘persistent objector exception’ itself might be a misnomer.113

Green criticized Lepard, maintaining that he “goes too far in claiming that
the persistence requirement might, on occasion, be dispensed with entirely.”114

106

See id. at 98 (“Academic commentary and state practice both point towards the need for objection
to be persistent . . . but . . . it is entirely unclear how many separate instances of objection are
enough to qualify: exactly how persistent is ‘persistent’?”).
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Colson, supra note 8, at 969.
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Id.
Id. at 967. See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 97.
Id. at 968.
See id. at 967–68.
Id. at 969.
Lepard, supra note 3, at 238.
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GREEN, supra note 1, at 104.
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Therefore, while it seems that the requirement for persistency of objection
may change according to the context, it is not exactly clear just how much
repetition will suffice. As the creation of CIL rules does not provide a clear
threshold for participants, it is fitting that the amount of persistency in POD is
also manifestly unclear:
It is well known that there is no set ‘amount’ or ‘quality’ of state practice
necessary for a new norm to form . . . It should therefore come as no surprise
that, for good or ill, this is also true of the persistence criterion in relation to
the persistent objector exception to the binding force of customary
international law. Indeed, it cannot be otherwise: an arbitrary threshold of any
set number of objections would be just as objectionable (as it were) as is the
context-specific approach.115

C. The Consistency Requirement
1. Consistency vs. Persistency
While POD’s name refers to the criterion of persistency, some writers have
pointed out that consistency is actually the doctrine’s leading requirement, and
have even replaced the notion of persistency with that of consistency. 116 The
requirement for consistency provides that “[a] state may not object some of the
time, apply the rule at other times, and still be a persistent objector.”117 While the
notion of persistency indicates repetition, the notion of consistency implies
uniformity: a demand that a state would not contradict its own objection. Thus, a
state could potentially be persistent in its objection, but not consistent, and would
thus be disqualified as a PO.118 A common example of such situation is the U.S.’s
objection to the CIL rule prohibiting capital punishment for juvenile offenders.119
The U.S. claimed PO status regarding this prohibition before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)120 in the Domingues case.121 The U.S.
115

Id. at 104–05.

116

See Lau, supra note 1, at 498 (“According to the persistent objector doctrine, these objectors shall
be exempt from the norm after it becomes law, so long as the state can rebut the assumption that
it acquiesced to the norm and prove that, instead, it exercised clear and consistent objections
throughout the norm’s emergence”); Guzman, supra note 100, at 142–43 (“[T]he state must make
its objections widely known, must do so before the practice solidifies into a rule of CIL, and must
make the objection on a consistent basis.”).

117

Loschin, supra note 84, at 147, 151.
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 109.
See id. at 109–11; Dumberry, supra note 8, at 789.
The IACHR is an organ of the Organization of American States (OAS), whose objective is to
promote and protect human rights in the American hemisphere. See What Is the IACHR, OAS,
https://perma.cc/Y33Z-HEXQ.
See Domingues, Case 12.285 ¶ 14. See also Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, Case 9647, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 3/87, OEA/Serv.L./V/II.71, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 38(h), (i) (1987) (The U.S. is
arguing for PO status in the context of juvenile executions.).
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claimed PO status regarding the prohibition on executions of juvenile offenders
altogether, and more specifically, to setting the threshold for the prohibition at
eighteen years of age rather than sixteen: “[e]ven if the execution of sixteen and
seventeen-years old offenders were prohibited by customary international law . . .
the United States has consistently and persistently objected to the application of
such a principle to the United States.”122
The U.S. relied on its domestic law to support its position, as “the laws of
many states within the United States provide for the prosecution of juveniles as
adults for the most serious crimes,”123 as well as its assertions in the international
arena: “the United States has persistently asserted its right to execute juvenile
offenders in multiple international fora.”124
The IACHR, while using the term “persistently,” substantially argued that
U.S. objections had not been consistent enough:
[T]he United States . . . rather than persistently objecting to the standard, has
in several significant respects recognized the propriety of this norm by, for
example, prescribing the age of 18 as the federal standard for the application
of capital punishment and by ratifying the Fourth Geneva Convention
without reservation to this standard.125

Eventually, the IACHR established that POD did not apply in this case, since
the juvenile execution prohibition was a jus cogens norm.126 However, it is evident
that, despite the confusion of terminology, the IACHR “viewed the objections of
the United States as insufficiently consistent, in spite of these objections being
repeated a significant number of times.”127 Green’s analysis indicates that
Domingues is, therefore, a good example of two POD-related issues: the importance
of consistency and the confusion between persistency and consistency in POD.128

2. The Level of Consistency
There are two different approaches that relate to the required level of
consistency for POD. The first approach, which is called “absolute

122

Response of the United States Government, dated 18 October 2001, 9–10, in DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 303, 310 (Sally J. Cummins & David P. Stewart eds.,
2001). See also Domingues, Case 12.285 ¶ 101.
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CUMMINS & STEWART, supra note 122, at 311.
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Id. (such international submissions include U.S. submissions to the United Nations General
Assembly, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, responses to U.N. Special
Rapporteurs, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Organization of American States, and the IACHR).
Domingues, Case 12.285 ¶ 85.
Id.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 111.
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consistency,”129 is a “one strike out” sort of approach, requiring that “a state
wishing to avail itself of the persistent objector rule must not, at any point during
the new law’s formation, affirm or accept that new norm.”130 The second
approach, which is called “general consistency,” provides that if a state has
maintained its objection in most instances, “one isolated occasion (or perhaps a
small number of occasions) of affirmation will not necessarily be enough to
undermine its overall persistent objector status.”131
While international tribunals have not discussed POD in such resolutions,
legal scholarship has leaned strongly toward absolute consistency.132
However, legal scholarship has thus far considered the issue of inconsistency
in a rather general manner, without cataloging the types of contradictions that
form inconsistency. As this Article will demonstrate, this leads to unreasonable
results, whereby minor contradictions are equal to substantive ones, and to
inconsistency in the analysis of consistency itself. Before offering guidelines to
differentiate the types of contradictions that would constitute inconsistency, the
different contradictions identified in the literature must be catalogued.

IV. T Y P E S OF C ONTRADIC TIONS C ONSTITU TING
I NC ONSISTE NC Y
This Section catalogues the contradictions to objections as identified in legal
literature. Surely, in some of the cases, the very initial identification of a successful
PO claim may be challenged. For example, some of the objections are arguably jus
cogens norms. However, my intention here is not to analyze the initial
determination that PO status has been achieved, but rather to identify the moment
such PO status has been described as lost. Therefore, the assumption of PO status
will be taken at face value for purposes of this analysis. Such examples will be later
analyzed and incorporated in the main thesis of the article.

A. Voting in International Fora
A common genre of contradiction to objections is voting in international
fora in favor of decisions that contradict the state’s previous POD objection.
For example, China’s claim to PO status regarding the rule eliminating the
war nexus requirement for crimes against humanity has been contested.133 China
has “clearly voiced its objection to the customary law status of crimes against
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117.
Id.
See id. at 107–34.
See Dan Zhu, China, Crimes Against Humanity and the International Criminal Court, 16 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 1021, 1033–35 (2018).
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humanity without a linkage to armed conflict.”134 However, its voting record in
the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA), as well as in the U.N. Security Council
(UNSC), is inconsistent with this prior objection: China voted in favor of G.A.
Resolution A/33/PV.93,135 adopted in 1979, which states that “apartheid is a
crime against the conscience and dignity of mankind,”136 and thus establishes the
existence of such a crime against humanity outside of armed conflict. Further,
China voted in favor of UNSC resolutions establishing the hybrid tribunals in East
Timor,137 Sierra Leone,138 and Cambodia,139 whose instruments “omit[ ] a
connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict.”140 Therefore, it
has been argued that China should be disqualified from having PO status to the
CIL rule that a crime against humanity can exist in the absence of a war.141
Another example is the U.S.’s and Israel’s objections to the application of
international human rights law (IHRL) during an armed conflict. Both the U.S.
and Israel claim to consider IHRL and international humanitarian law (IHL) as
mutually exclusive bodies of law that do not overlap.142 However, both states have
voted in favor of resolutions to the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and Sudan, which assume the overlapping applicability of both bodies of law. 143
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

143

Id. at 133–34.
See Voting Summary on A/33/PV.93, UN DIGIT. LIBR., https://perma.cc/56JG-3KQZ.
G.A. Res. 33/183, at 27 (Jan. 24, 1979).
S.C. Res. 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
S.C. Res. 745 (Feb. 28, 1992).
Zhu, supra note 133, at 1034.
See id.
See Second Periodic Rep. of the Gov’t of Israel, at ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (2001)
(Israel argues that the “the Committee’s mandate cannot relate to events in the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, inasmuch as they are part and parcel of the context of armed conflict as distinct from a
relationship of human right”); Permanent United States to the U.N., Letter dated 2 April 2003 from
the Permanent Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations Office at Geneva
addressed to the Secretariat of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/G/73
(Apr. 7 2003). For examples in literature, see Francoise J. Hampson, The Relationship between
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body,
90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 550–51 (2008); Nigel S. Rodley, Detention as a Response to Terrorism, in
COUNTER-TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 457, 461 (Ana Salinas de Frías et al.
eds., 2012); Ilia Maria Siatitsa & Maia Titberidze, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Ten Years of
Affirmative State Practice within United Nations Resolutions, 3 J. INT’L HUMAN. LEGAL STUD. 233, 242–
43 (2012).
See G.A. Res. 60/170, § 4(a) (Dec. 16, 2005) (condemning “the ongoing violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo); G.A. Res.
A/RES/57/230 (18 December 2002) § 3(b) (urging the parties “to respect and protect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, to respect fully international humanitarian law, in particular the need to
ensure the protection of civilians and civilian premises, thereby facilitating the voluntary return,
repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes, and to
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The U.S. and Israel also voted in favor of resolutions condemning Iraq for the
violation of IHL and IHRL norms, implying the applicability of IHRL during
armed conflict.144 Siatitsa & Titberidze have subsequently concluded that the
voting records of the U.S. and Israel disqualify both states from PO status
regarding this rule of CIL.145
Inconsistency in objection as a consequence of voting in international fora
was also attributed to the U.K. regarding its past objection to the right to selfdetermination in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) dispute
from 2010 between Mauritius and the U.K.146 Mauritius initiated proceedings
against the U.K. under the UNCLOS dispute settlement provisions, requesting
that the establishment of a marine protected area up to the outer limit of the
exclusive economic zone of the Chagos Archipelago be declared in violation of
UNCLOS.147 Mauritius further argued that the detachment of the Chagos
Archipelago in 1965, while Mauritius was still a colony of the U.K., and the
retention thereof in 1968, violated its customary right to self-determination.148 The
U.K. argued to the contrary, stating that at the time of declaration it retained PO
status regarding the right of self-determination, and thus was not bound by it.149
Mauritius, which did not agree that the U.K. was exempt from its
international obligations as a result of its PO status, pointed out that the U.K. had
contradicted its own objections, thus engaging in inconsistency because of its vote
in favor of 1961 G.A. Resolution 1723 (XVI) affirming the right of

144

145

146

147
148
149

ensure that those responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are
brought to justice”).
See G.A. Res. 57/232, § 5(a) (Dec. 18, 2002); G.A. Res. 56/174, § 4(a) (Dec. 19, 2001); G.A. Res.
55/115 § 4(a) (Dec. 4, 2000).
See also Siatitsa & Titberidze, supra note 142, at 243–44, 261:
[T]he US had voted in favour of resolutions explicitly affirming the application
of HRL and condemning the violations thereof in times of armed conflicts on
numerous occasions. Even if we were to accept the doctrine of a persistent
objector, who is exempt from the development of a rule of international law,
the two States (Israel and the US), that oppose the application of HRL would
not be able to rely thereon, as their own practice does not reveal consistency as
is required under the doctrine of the persistent objector.
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. U.K.), 31 R.1.A.A. 359, ¶¶ 209, 211 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2015), https://perma.cc/ED7F-CFHF.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Id. ¶¶ 61, 393. See also GREEN, supra note 1, at 112.
See Arbitration Under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Mauritius v. U.K.), Counter-Memorial of the U.K., ¶ 7.17 (Perm. Ct. Arb. July 15, 2013),
https://perma.cc/G3GU-6JQK (“The United Kingdom had consistently, throughout the 1950s
and 1960s, objected to references to a ‘right’ of self-determination in United Nations instruments,
including in the drafts of the International Covenants of 1966. It did not, in 1965, accept that the
principle of self-determination had hardened into a legal right.”).
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self-determination.150 While the tribunal did not decide on the matter of the U.K.’s
PO status in terms of the right of self-determination, the discussion between the
U.K. and Mauritius during the course of proceedings—with both arguing that
voting records in international fora proved or rebutted consistency—
demonstrates the centrality of voting records in establishing this requirement of
POs.

B. Entering into International Agreements
Sometimes, when the objector state signs a treaty in which it agrees to act in
a manner that contradicts its former objection, this has been considered a
contradiction to such an objection. This constitutes an inconsistency, and thus
disqualifies the state from PO status.
Turkey has traditionally claimed PO status regarding the CIL rule prohibiting
the use, production, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines (AL). 151
According to Green, Turkey’s agreement with Bulgaria obliging the states “not to
use under any circumstances antipersonnel mines and to destroy or remove all
stocked or emplaced antipersonnel mines from the area of application as defined
in the Agreement”152 contradicts Turkey’s prior objection.153 While Green
considered such an agreement proof of inconsistency, this is not necessarily the
case. The fact that Turkey is opposed to the rule of CIL prohibiting the use of
ALs does not mean Turkey should actively endorse ALs. However, it may be
suggested that to avoid claims of inconsistency, Turkey merely had to add a
reservation to the treaty providing that it was maintaining its objection. Indeed,
treaty reservation is a valid manner of establishing and maintaining PO status.154

C. Judicial Decisions
Domestic judicial decisions that are in line with a state’s objection strengthen
that state’s PO claim.155 Colson provided that the domestic adjudication arena is a
good platform to present arguments supporting the state’s position:
150

151
152

153
154

155

See Arbitration Under Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(Mauritius v. U.K.), Reply of the Republic of Mauritius, 143–48 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 18, 2013),
https://perma.cc/N9S6-TTLZ.
See GREEN, supra note 1, at 117–19.
Joint Statement, H.E. Ismail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, & H.E.
Ms. Nadezhda Mihhailova, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria (Mar. 22, 1999),
https://perma.cc/T95W-SQ4Z.
GREEN, supra note 1, at 119.
Dumberry, supra note 8, at 781 (“Objections can thus be made in various circumstances,
including . . . reservations made when signing/ratifying treaties, etc.”).
Loschin, supra note 113, at 165 (“Is there domestic legislation or court decisions that are consistent
with the objection? If so, the objector’s position is strengthened.”).
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Pronouncements upon international law by domestic courts, or by the
government before such courts, are certainly candidates for citation in the
international courtroom. In this setting, legal rationale, distinctions, and the
fine points of the law are more likely to be honed to a sharpness not found
in extra-judicial situations. Therefore, these are particularly useful situations
for the practitioner to put the national legal position, on the record; and, thus,
is another excellent opportunity for the persistent objector. 156

This observation refers to the positive effect of domestic case law. However,
the situation is not as clear where domestic case law contradicts a state’s objection.
As will be described below, judicial decisions that contradict a state’s former
objection to a rule of CIL have sometimes been described as constituting
inconsistency in a state’s objection. As can be inferred by the examples below,
judicial decisions constitute inconsistency when they (1) are provided by the
highest judicial body and (2) have a practical effect on a state’s actions. This is not
a binding rule, but more of a deduction.
For example, Curtis Bradley, a professor of law at the University of Chicago,
described U.S. practice regarding juvenile executions, demonstrating that
throughout American history, juvenile executions were carried out regularly,
constituting almost 2% of the total number of executions.157 However, Bradley
observed that “[n]o juvenile executions were carried out . . . between 1965 and
1984, in part because of the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Furman v.
Georgia . . . which effectively stopped any use of the death penalty in the United
States for a number of years.”158Green referred to Bradley’s analysis, arguing that
“[o]ne might, for example, point to the domestic case law of the United States as
evidence of inconsistent practice in relation to the application of the juvenile death
penalty.”159
In addition, researchers Lapidot, Shany, and Rosenzweig suggested that
Israel considers itself a PO regarding the Additional Protocols (AP) of the Geneva
Conventions.160 However, because the Supreme Court of Israel has relied on these
Protocols, Israel may have lost its PO status in this context.161 Israel has mostly

156
157
158
159
160

161

Colson, supra note 8, at 961.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 493 (2002).
Id. at 493 (footnote omitted).
GREEN, supra note 1, at 110.
See RUTH LAPIDOT ET AL., ISRAEL AND THE TWO PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS v–vi (2011).
See, e.g., Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, HCJ 769/02, 465–66 (2016) (Isr.):
A prohibition of this kind derives also from the duties of the occupying power
in an occupied territory vis-à-vis the occupied population, which constitutes a
protected population under the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949, and also according to the
two additional protocols to the convention that were signed in 1977. All these
laws reflect norms of customary international law and they bind Israel.
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objected to issues concerning national liberation conflicts.162 Its objections
resonate in the context of Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol 1 (AP1), which
provides that AP1 applies to “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against
colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination.”163 Israeli representative Hess, in the voting
session on AP1, reiterated the following objections: (1) “reference to the motives
and cause for which belligerents were fighting” was “in clear contradiction to the
spirit and accepted norms of international humanitarian law and to the preamble
to [AP1]”;164 (2) the clause is impractical as “a party would have to admit that it
was either racist, alien or colonial—definitions which no State would ever admit
to”;165 (3) article 1, § 4 of AP1 requires the amendment of other AP1 provisions
to suit non-states;166 (4) the article represents an attempt “to introduce political
resolutions that were properly the responsibility of political organizations such as
the United Nations into rules of international humanitarian law.”167
However, Lapidot, Shany, and Rosenzweig did not demonstrate that the
Israeli Supreme Court’s rulings contradicted this objection; rather, they argued
that the targeted killing case made the objection irrelevant by classifying the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an international armed conflict (IAC) rather than a
non-international armed conflict.168
Another PO issue that may be raised with reference to Israel is its claimed
PO status concerning the overlapping application of IHL and IHRL.169 While
arguments regarding Israel’s disqualification from PO status have arisen in relation
to its voting record in international fora, one may also point out that the Israeli
Supreme Court requires IHRL norms to be applied under IHL settings. Such
inferences can be drawn from cases of targeted killing, as the court established in
one such case that “[w]here this law has a lacuna, it can be filled by means of

166

See LAPIDOT ET AL., supra note 160, at iv.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(4) (June 8, 1977).
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts Geneva, 36th plen. mtg., 41 ¶ 60, CDDH/SR.36 (May 23, 1977),
https://perma.cc/LQ43-85TY.
Id. at 41 ¶ 61.
Id. at 41 ¶ 62–63.

167

Id. at 41 ¶ 64.

168

See LAPIDOT ET AL., supra note 160, at vi:
Moreover, the interpretation of the High Court of Justice . . . according to which
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in some respects international in character—
renders it unnecessary to determine whether the present conflict falls under
article 1(4) of the First Additional Protocol (the article with respect to
applicability to a war for national liberation) and greatly restricted, if it did not
completely obviate, the practical implications of the Israeli objection to this
article.
See supra Section IV.A. See also supra note 142.
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international human rights law.”170 A similar inference can be drawn from Yesh
Din v. Chief Prosecutor, a recent case dealing with the Gaza border demonstrations,
in which the court accepted the existence of a law enforcement paradigm under
the rules of armed conflict.171 This, too, may be offered as evidence for Israel’s
inconsistency in arguing that IHRL and IHL are two mutually exclusive bodies of
law that do not overlap.

D. Passive Contradictions
Other forms of contradictions to objections are passive contradictions.
Passive contradictions can be divided into two major groups—omissions and
silence. The term, “omission,” in the POD contradiction context usually refers to
a lack of practical behavior. For example, the fictional state of Acadia described
above argues that crossbows are not forbidden yet refrains from using crossbows
in combat. This is not actually a contradiction, but as will demonstrated, is often
mistakenly portrayed as such. Silence indicates a failure to express dissent against
the objected rule of CIL—for example, if a state objects to a rule forbidding the
use of crossbows, yet does not submit its reservations while signing a treaty, that
may affect the status of crossbows in international law. To clarify the difference,
the avoidance of contradiction by omission would demand that a state act
practically in accordance with its objection; to circumvent contradiction by silence,
a state would be required to voice its objection when necessary (corresponding
with the persistency requirement of POD).

1. Contradiction by Omission
There are various examples of contradictions by omission in the legal
literature, as will be described in this Subsection. In such examples, legal scholars
have expected states to actually and practically act upon their objections; thus,
they have argued that that states are required to not only object to the prohibition
in the objected rule of CIL, but to also act upon the prohibited behavior in order
to maintain PO status. Refraining from being bound by a particular rule
prohibiting a particular behavior does not equate with being required to act upon
that prohibited behavior.
A striking example presented by David Glazier, Zora Colakovic, Alexandra
Gonzalez and Zacharias Tripodes, is that the U.S.’s PO claim with regard to the
prohibition of the use of expanding bullets (dumdum bullets) has weakened
because of its refusal to procure such bullets (even when its own expert study

170
171

See Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel, supra note 161, ¶ 18.
Yesh Din v. IDF Chief of Staff, HCJ 3003/18, 3250/18, ¶ 40 (2018) (Isr.). See generally Shelly Aviv
Yeini, The Law Enforcement Paradigm under the Laws of Armed Conflict: Conceptualizing Yesh Din v. IDF
Chief of Staff, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 461 (2019).
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team advised their procurement).172 In other words, the authors expected the U.S.
to actively purchase (and supposedly use) expanding bullets to maintain its PO
status.
Another example refers to Hong Kong’s PO claim regarding the CIL norm
of non-refoulement that forbids states from sending back refugees to countries in
which they would be in danger of persecution on various grounds.173 In the case
of C v. Director of Immigration, brought before the Hong Kong Court of First
Instance, Justice Hartmann provided that “by consistent and long-standing
objection, Hong Kong has refused to accede to the rule and the rule, being
contrary to Hong Kong’s laws, has not been incorporated into its domestic law.”174
Oliver Jones, an Australian barrister, criticized Justice Hartmann’s conclusion,
arguing that “[t]he obvious difficulty with Hartmann J’s finding was the evidence
that Hong Kong had consistently refrained from repatriating people to face
persecution.”175 Green echoed Jones’s argument, noting that Hong Kong’s
objection was inconsistent, as “Hong Kong has regularly refrained from
repatriating people to face prosecution in circumstances that would entail the
application of the rule.”176 Green provided that such a practice “can be seen as
rather undermining the Director of Immigration’s claim that Hong Kong was
exempt.”177 Both Jones and Green expected Hong Kong to actively send refugees
to their countries of origin to maintain PO status. However, one must recall that
Hong Kong does not argue that it must send refugees back to their countries, but
merely that it is not obliged to refrain from it. More simply put, Hong Kong
considers that it has the discretion to determine under which circumstances it can
return refugees; it does not desire to always return them. Once again, the approach
that considers omission as a form of contradiction pushes countries to radicalize
their behavior to maintain their objections.
A third example is that of China’s objection to the rule eliminating the war
nexus requirement for crimes against humanity.178 Dan Zhu referred to China not
using its veto power in the UNSC to block its referral to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in situations that are not clearly classified as armed conflict:

172

David Glazier, et. al., Failing Our Troops: A Critical Assessment of the Department of Defense Law of War
Manual, 42 YALE J. INT’L L. 216, 252–54 (2017).

173

177

See generally Seline Trevisanut, International Law and Practice: The Principle of Non-Refoulement and the DeTerritorialization of Border Control at Sea, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 661 (2014).
C v. Director of Immigration, [2008] 2 HKC 165, ¶ 194(iii) (H.K.).
Oliver Jones, Customary Non-Refoulement of Refugees and Automatic Incorporation into the Common Law: A
Hong Kong Perspective, 58 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 443, 451 (2009).
GREEN, supra note 1, at 114.
Id.

178

For discussion regarding China’s objection, see supra Section IV.A.
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When the Security Council acted quickly outside clear armed conflict, China
did not use its veto power to block the Council’s referral of situation in Libya
to the ICC, which issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity without
mentioning “armed conflict.” To sum up, even though China raised its
objection towards eliminating the war nexus requirement for crimes against
humanity at Rome, it cannot be considered to be a persistent objector. 179

While China’s use of veto power would have strengthened its objection, it is
problematic to expect China to use its veto power solely to maintain its objection,
as there are wider considerations for the use of the veto power, which should not
be so easily deployed.180 It is absurd to encourage permanent five (P5) states to
use their veto power, as this is contrary to international interests, especially in cases
concerning mass atrocities and violations of human rights.181

2. Contradiction by Silence
Contradiction by silence is a form of inconsistency, but perhaps more so a
lack of persistency. It is evident when the objecting state has neglected to voice
an objection when such an objection would have been warranted. While silence
may constitute an objection or a contradiction thereof, “[g]enerally, ‘louder’ forms
of objection that explain the objector’s position are more likely to qualify as
persistent objection than passive and ambiguous statements or objection in the
form of silence.”182
For example, it has been rightfully argued that to maintain PO status with
regard to the overlapping statuses of IHL and IHRL, the U.S. and Israel should
have to make reservations or declarations to expressly exclude the application of
IHRL in armed conflict:
One would expect to find not only reservations at ratification but also
objections to general comments which directly or indirectly deal with the
issue. That is particularly true of the United States, which criticized general

179

180

Zhu, supra note 133, at 1034. Note that this is one of few examples Zhu provided for China’s failure
to maintain its objection.
It has been argued that sometimes P5 members have a responsibility not to use their veto power.
See Ariela Blatter & Paul D. Williams, The Responsibility Not to Veto, 3 GLOB. RESP. PROTECT 301,
304–05 (2011).

181

See id. It could be argued that in this example, unlike the other examples, the use of a UNSC veto
takes place in the international arena, in which a country should be aware of the way its behavior
shapes its CIL positions. Therefore, one could expect that if China had chosen not to use its veto
power, it should at least have verbally clarified that it nevertheless objected to the relevant principle.
However, a claim that China failed to explain that it maintained its objection, despite its lack of
deployment of veto power, would be a claim of contradiction by silence and not of contradiction
by omission.

182

Molly C. Quinn, Life without Parole for Juvenile Offenders: A Violation of Customary International Law, 52
ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 283, 309 (2007).
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comment No. 24 but has submitted no observations on general comments
Nos. 29 and 31.183

The absence of a declaration of objection would not usually manifest a
contradiction disqualifying a state from its PO status184; rather, it might impair the
state’s persistency, which is a context-specific requirement rather than an absolute
requirement.185 Clearly, the two categories are not completely distinct, and a lack
of persistency will lead to inconsistency. However, “[c]onsistency does not require
that an objection, however lodged, be senselessly repeated” 186; therefore, not all
cases of silence would disqualify a state from its PO status. The answer here is
that the result would depend on the context.187

E. Domestic Legislation
Statements of a national legal position that can either strengthen or
contradict a state’s objection fall within the domestic lawmaking setting, as
“[n]ational legislation or proclamations from officials of the responsible branches
of government often contain clear-cut statements of national position on
international issues.”188
An example of domestic law strengthening a state’s claim for PO status may
be found in Botswana’s law book, in which several statutes allow corporal
punishment in some circumstances, though it is prohibited under CIL.189
However, it is more difficult to find examples of domestic legislation
undermining a PO status. This may be because domestic lawmaking is a
complicated process in which a state’s position is carefully tailored; thus, mistakes
or lapses are not likely. However, when a domestic act expressly contradicts a
former objection, this is considered a form of contradiction sufficient to disqualify
PO status.
The case of Mauritania and its objection to the rule forbidding female genital
mutilation (FGM) is a good example of such a situation. Green argued that
Mauritania has been considered a PO to the emerging norm forbidding FGM, a
183

184
185

186

187
188
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Francoise Hampson & Ibrahim Salama, Working Paper on the Relationship between Human Rights Law
and International Humanitarian Law, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14, ¶ 70 (June 21, 2005).
LEPARD, supra note 3, at 237–239.
Colson, supra note 8, at 967–69 (“The actions required of a persistent objector depend on the
category of the situation.”).
J. Brock McClane, How Late in the Emergence of a Norm of Customary International Law May a Persistent
Objector Object, 13 ILSA J. INT’L L. 1, 2 n.2 (1989).
See supra Section III.B for the context of persistency.
Colson, supra note 8, at 959.
Bugalo Maripe, The Recognition and Enforcement of Children’s Rights in Domestic Law: An Assessment of the
Child Protection Laws in Botswana in Light of Prevailing International Trends, 9 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 339,
350 (2001).
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claim largely supported by the fact that Mauritania had refused to pass a law
criminalizing FGM.190 However, in 2005, Mauritania reversed its position by
adopting Ordonnance No.2005-015 criminalizing FGM.191 Green stated that
“[t]his act of domestic law-making has been considered enough to undermine any
possible persistent objector status [by Mauritania].”192
It may be suggested that while some types of contradictions may reflect a
lapse or an error (or even contradicting voices within state branches) in
maintaining a state’s PO status, domestic legislation could actually be considered
a planned change in position—that is, a way by which the state deliberately accepts
the rule to which it once objected.

F. Statements by Officials in Different Ranks
Statements made by state officials may serve as tools to articulate a state’s
objection to a particular international norm. Such statements include, but are not
limited to, “statements made in formal debates of international organizations or
other similar fora.”193 Indeed, official statements deliberately aimed at solidifying
a state’s objection in international fora during debates regarding such norms are a
classic form of strengthening a state’s objection and are quite common. For
example, New Zealand’s PO position regarding Indigenous rights to land
Indigenous peoples have traditionally owned, occupied, or used has extensively
articulated by official statements in international fora.194 In the same way,
statements carried out in such fora contradicting a state’s objection will create
inconsistency, thus disqualifying that state from its PO status. Returning to the
New Zealand example, official statements supporting Indigenous rights to land
have disqualified New Zealand from its PO status.195 The U.S. position regarding
the mutually exclusive applicability of IHRL and IHL has also been undermined
by official statements at international fora: Mary McLeod, then Acting Legal
Adviser for the U.S. Department of State, stated in the U.N. Committee Against
Torture that the IHRL right not to be tortured continues to apply during armed
conflict.196
190
191
192
193
194

195
196

GREEN, supra note 1 at 87–88.
Ordonnance No. 2005-015 of Dec. 5, 2005 (Maur.).
GREEN, supra note 1 at 88.
Id.
See, e.g., Kiri Toki, Maori Rights and Customary International Law, 18 AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 250, 258–
59 (2012).
Id. at 260.
Mary E. McLeod, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opening Statement at the U.N.
Committee Against Torture (Nov. 12, 2014) (“[A] time of war does not suspend operation of the
Convention Against Torture, which continues to apply even when a State is engaged in armed
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The question as to whether greater weight should be given to a “situation
falling within the domain of international relations, or to some actual incident or
episode of claim-making (as opposed to assertions in abstracto)” has been raised in
the field of CIL state practice and dismissed as too narrow.197 However, as POD
requires states to object by statement and aims for claim-making behavior, such
statements are important in the POD context. This does not negate the fact that
statements made in the domestic arena may carry significant weight as well.
Nonetheless, it becomes more difficult to find instances in which state officials
have provided contradictions in the domestic arena without a link to international
(or legal) deliberations. It is difficult to tell whether such a paucity of examples in
the literature can be attributed to the lack of importance of such statements to the
POD or to the lack of accessibility of such statements. Naturally, domestic
statements given to domestic media in a state’s own language are not as accessible
to legal scholars as those provided in English in international fora.

V. C ONSIDE RATIONS F OR THE I DE NTIF IC ATION OF
C ONTRADIC TIONS
While it is widely accepted that a state’s objection should be consistent to
constitute a valid PO claim, it is not clear which instances constitute contradictions
forming inconsistency or indicate legitimate behavior that would not damage a
PO claim. On the one hand, some behaviors definitely constitute a contradiction.
For example, voting on an international platform in favor of a rule that had been
previously objected to would be clearly contradictory. However, other behaviors
that have been considered contradictions should not necessarily be deemed so.
One such example is claiming that a certain piece of weaponry is not prohibited
by CIL but not purchasing it.
This is not to undermine the idea that POD requires absolute consistency.
However, it is necessary to separate an actual “lapse” from behavior that might
not reflect rejection, but nevertheless does not contradict it.
This Section offers considerations to take into account when assessing
whether the behavior of an objecting state constitutes a contradiction to its prior
objection. Such considerations aid in separating contradictions forming
inconsistency from behavior not impairing consistency.

conflict. The obligations to prevent torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and
punishment in the Convention remain applicable in times of armed conflict.”).
197

Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n., Second Report on Identification of Customary
International Law, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/672 (May 22, 2014).
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A. The Logical
Contradiction

Connection

between

Objection

and

To accurately assess whether a state has contradicted its objection, we must
ask, what is the state objecting to? This may sound like a trivial inquiry; however, some
of the cases in which it has been claimed that states have lost PO status seem to
exhibit a flawed analysis of the object of the objection. The next step is to properly
identify the substance of the argued contradiction and to assess whether the state’s
objection and the claimed contradiction are actually contradictory.
For example, in the case of the U.S. objection to the rule prohibiting
dumdum bullets, Glazier et al. argue that, because the U.S. did not purchase such
bullets (even when advised to do so), it contradicted its objection.198 However,
does the U.S.’s objection to the rule prohibiting the use of dumdum bullets
actually suggest that it considers that it must use dumdum bullets? More
reasonably, the U.S. assumes it has the discretion to determine whether to use such
bullets—even if their use will seldom be necessary. Therefore, a refusal to acquire
such bullets does not actually contradict the objection, since the objection assumes
that the U.S. may use such ammunition and not that it must do so.
Both Jones and Green consider that Hong Kong may be disqualified from
PO status since it had refrained from sending refugees back to places of
persecution.199 However, Hong Kong never argued that its refugees must return
to places where they may be persecuted; rather, it held that it had the discretion
to choose whether to return them.200 In fact, the core of the objection by Hong
Kong is that it intended to protect the “unfettered discretion to the Director” with
regard to the non-refoulement of refugees.201 Therefore, the fact that the
discretion of the director has so far not entailed returning refugees to countries
where they risk persecution does not actually contradict the objection made by
Hong Kong.
In the case of Turkey, it has been claimed that Turkey’s behavior falls short
of PO status with regard to the prohibition of ALs because of its agreement with

198
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200

201

Glazier et al., supra note 172, at 252–53.
Jones, supra note 175, at 451(“The obvious difficulty with Hartmann J's finding was the evidence
that Hong Kong had consistently refrained from repatriating people to face persecution, including
within the meaning of the Convention and Protocol”); GREEN, supra note 1, at 114: (“The
objections…had notably been inconsistent, as had Hong Kong's own practice. For example, Hong
Kong has regularly refrained from repatriating people to face prosecution in circumstances that
would entail the application of the rule.”).
Director of Immigration, 2 HKC ¶ 38 (“Further, even if there were such an international law of nonrefoulement of refugees, it is contradicted by domestic legislation, as the Ordinance has given the
Director the discretion whether to permit a person to land or remain in Hong Kong.”).
Id. at ¶ 96.
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Bulgaria to maintain their shared border in the absence of ALs.202 Turkey’s
position has been that it objects to the CIL rule forbidding ALs since its security
concerns might require their use.203 Surely, this does not mean that Turkey must
use ALs. Moreover, if Turkey feels that its relations with Bulgaria are stable, and
that this stability allows it to remove all ALs from the shared border, it still may
be that on other borders, with less stable relations, security reasons may
nevertheless justify the use of ALs. Turkey should be able to maintain the position
that it is not bound by international law to remove ALs, but rather has chosen to
remove them, or refrain from using them, voluntarily.
The need to differentiate between the total rejection of a principle and
discretion regarding its application has been addressed in the context of the U.S.
PO position regarding the imprisonment of juveniles for life without parole.
Quinn examined whether the recent decrease in such punishment is indicative of
the U.S.’s objection:
In 2000, the last year for which data is available, 91 juvenile offenders were
sentenced to life without parole, a number that is less than sixty percent of
the number sentenced in 1996. Of course, the decreased usage of life without
parole sentences does not necessarily indicate that the United States has
changed its position in terms of its right to sentence youth offenders to such
sentences. 204

Quinn rightfully identified the U.S.’s argument that it had discretion whether to
sentence juveniles to life without parole, and therefore, observed that a decrease
in such sentences would not logically contradict the objection.205 Discretion may
lead to greater or fewer sentences of life without parole, and thus should not be
considered a contradiction.
Scholars often misidentify contradictions by assuming that states object to
an issue—as in reject it all together—and do not exhibit discretion regarding its
applicability. However, occasionally states object to an issue entirely, rather than
assuming discretion. For example, the U.S. and Israel do not argue that IHRL and
IHL sometimes overlap, but on the contrary, that they are always mutually
exclusive.206 The arguments that “X never applies” and that “there is discretion to
decide whether X applies” are not the same. It is important to understand the
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substance of the objection, and only then to analyze whether the behavior in
question logically contradicts it.

B. The Global Interest in Not Radicalizing States’ Stands
POD is often analyzed using a context-specific approach; for example,
persistency is “based on a range of factors . . . including extra-legal ones.”207 Thus,
it is not unreasonable that consistency may be assessed via a contextual approach
as well. The interest of the international community is a relevant factor in the
shaping of POD. For example, in statements made during negotiations, states are
not likely to be required to aggressively maintain their objections “due to the
international interest in seeing such disputes resolved peaceably.”208 The same
logic that applies to peace talks should also apply to other instances affecting the
global community, such as the use of veto power in the UNSC, disarmament, and
other similar instances. This does not mean that contradictions should be
disregarded and overlooked on account of the global interest, but rather that an
overly strict understanding of which behaviors constitute a contradiction harms
the global interest, and thus, a more nuanced approach is preferred.
It is important to consider that POD contradictions should not be
understood in a manner that would require states to radicalize their positions to
maintain their objections. Instead, the expectation should be for states to object
in an honest manner, reflecting their stance regarding an emerging rule of CIL,
rather than to adopt a radically contradictive position. This is most clearly
apparent in cases of contradiction by omission. The argument that the U.S. should
be disqualified from PO status regarding the prohibition of dumdum bullets
because of its refusal to obtain such bullets is an apt example. 209 Expecting the
U.S. to actively purchase dumdum bullets to maintain its objection radicalizes the
U.S.’s position, which assumes discretion regarding the acquisition of such
ammunition, and it further contradicts the global community’s interest as it
ironically encourages the U.S. to purchase these bullets.
Similarly, expecting China to actively use its veto power for the sole purpose
of maintaining its objection is clearly contradictory to the international interest. 210
As the veto power should be used carefully, the state’s own objection to a rule of
CIL is not a powerful enough reason to veto a UNSC decision of a much wider
scope, especially in cases where lives are endangered and the deployment of a veto
207
208
209
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GREEN, supra note 1, at 91. See also Lepard, supra note 3, at 238; Colson, supra note 8, at 967-69.
Colson, supra note 8, at 968.
See Glazier et al., supra note 172, at 253 (arguing that U.S. not purchasing dumdum bullets when
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would prevent relief. Adopting an unrealistic standard whereby P5 states must use
their veto power to maintain an objection is by no means desirable.
States should not be encouraged to use various types of harmful weapons.
The U.S.’s preference not to use dumdum bullets is a positive development. That
China does not allow its narrow interests to interrupt an important UNSC decision
is positive as well. A reading of POD as requiring states to actively purchase
weapons and requiring P5 states to veto important decisions is strictly against the
interests of the international community. However, this does not mean that
contradictions should not be recognized as such just because they do not align
with the global interest. However, the question of what qualifies as a contradiction
should be answered in a manner that will not encourage states to radicalize their
positions simply to maintain PO status.

C. Does the Objection Reflect the State’s Position?
Another important aspect of identifying inconsistency is whether the
arguable contradiction reflects the position of the state. Even behavior that indeed
logically contradicts a state’s conduct may not actually reflect the state’s stance.
Over the years, philosophers have developed different theories regarding the
voice of the state, and whether the state should speak in one or various voices.
When exploring the position whereby the state speaks in one voice, one may first
refer to Hobbes, as “Hobbes was the first major philosopher to organise a theory
of government around the person of the state.”211 According to Hobbes, the state
can be defined as “One Person.”212 While naturally, a state comprises many
people, it is “the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that
maketh the Person One.”213 Quentin Skinner explains that Hobbes’s “One
Person”—the sovereign—may be “a natural person, as in the case of monarchy,
or an assembly of natural persons, as in the case of aristocracy or democracy.” 214
However, the sovereign is always “the absolute Representative of all the
subjects.”215
In such a Hobbesian state, identifying who has contradicted an objection
should be simple, as the state is one and speaks with one voice. However, this
theory does not seem to capture the way liberal democracies actually work, and
therefore, is only partially helpful in unraveling contradictions reflecting the
positions of states. A modern, well-grounded, separation-of-powers jurisprudence
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is widely characterized by normative pluralism, and the thick political context
consists of “institutional contestation inside and around the three branches.”216 In
a democracy, “some measure of contestation over norms and policy is not only
desirable, but probably necessary.”217 While states have often aimed to prevent a
plurality of voices from creating internal contradictions,218 in reality, a plurality of
statements and actions, sometimes reflecting different normative values and
beliefs, may often be found within a single system.219 However, not all statements
and actions are created equal, as some may carry greater weight and significance
than others.
For example, it is clear that if a low-ranking government officer of the state
of Arcadia states that he believes that Arcadia is obligated under the CIL rule
prohibiting the use of crossbows, despite previous objections, such a statement
does not reflect the position of the state and thus will not form a contradiction
disqualifying Arcadia from PO status. However, should the prime minister of
Arcadia convey the same statement in a U.N. speech, all would surely agree that
the statement contradicted Arcadia's former objection and thus disqualified it
from PO status. While the examples above presented extreme differences in rank,
modern states have a wide spectrum of state officials—ambassadors, ministers,
legal advisers, military personnel, and other state officials––who could make
statements on different platforms contradicting the state’s prior objection.
However, in these intermediate cases, unlike statements by a prime minister, it is
less clear whether these statements represent the true position of the state.
Clearly, the rank of the person delivering the statement, or the capacity of
the institution carrying out the decision, has weight in the determination of
whether the statement or decision reflects the state’s position. This is not to say
that a low-ranking official will never contradict a state’s objection; rather,
contradictory behaviors by high-ranking officials, who, by definition, have the
capacity to represent state policy, will always constitute a contradiction. For
low-ranking officials or institutions, such contradictory behaviors may
nevertheless reflect a state’s position, especially if the statements or decisions have
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been delivered in an arena designated to reflect the state’s position,220 if such a
decision practically affects the issue at hand,221 or if the field of the contradicted
objection falls within the professional capacity of the official delivering the
statement.222 For example, a lower court judgment will not likely reflect a state’s
position by itself; but if such judgment has had actual influence on the state’s
behavior concerning the issue at hand, it will matter for the POD assessment. In
addition, statements delivered at arenas of international relations, such as the U.N.
or an international tribunal, will be understood to reflect a state’s position.223

D. POD Should be a Realistic Possibility
If POD has a role to play in international law, which is the stance of most
authorities, it should be realistic to successfully argue for PO status. POD is
characterized by rigorous theoretical engagement alongside very little utility in
practice.224 In fact, while states have attempted to argue for PO status, it is difficult
to do so successfully “because the criteria for the rule’s operation are so
onerous.”225 It has been argued that states manage to benefit from POD, even if
it is not successfully invoked, as a “face-saving device . . . [to] present [themselves]
as sovereign and autonomous.”226 However, reducing POD to such usage misses
its true purpose as an opt-out mechanism allowing exemption from an objected-to
CIL norm.
Ted Stein, a law professor at the University of Washington, predicted that
POD will find more expression in modern international law;227 however, nearly
four decades after Stein’s predictions, no such advancement has occurred.228 It
220
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seems that the approach to POD, specifically from the perspective of legal writers,
is very much directed at finding lapses. Writers who wish to oblige states in CIL
norms claim POD contradiction too easily, setting an impossible standard for
objection. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that the legal community
has not properly identified what POD contradictions mean and, more
importantly, what behaviors are permitted within the POD framework that would
not disqualify a state from PO status.
Therefore, the final step in the interpretation of the term “contradiction” in
the context of POD inconsistency is keeping in mind that an overly narrow
interpretation that renders POD practically unavailable to states is undesirable.
Indeed, POD should not be easily argued; it is not an easy outlet from the
application of CIL.
However, while it should not be simple to achieve PO status, it should not
be impossible. The factors suggested above––(1) maintaining a logical connection
between objection and contradiction, (2) not expecting states to radicalize their
stands just for the sake of maintaining a PO status, and (3) ensuring that the
contradiction in question was delivered by an authority that actually reflects the
position of the state—are all important for reinforcing POD as a realistic option
for states. To make POD relevant, scholars should approach POD with integrity
and should not use it as tool for achieving a desired conclusion. The temptation
to declare a rule of CIL as obliging all states is admittedly great; however, the
difference between lex lata and lex ferenda should not be artificially erased by a
manipulation of POD. POD is unique in the sense that it has been widely
developed by legal scholars;229 therefore, legal scholars have a great responsibility
to assess its application fairly.

VI. C ONC LU SION
POD is recognized by the vast majority of legal authorities as an inseparable
part of modern international law,230 embedded in the “orthodox doctrine of the
sources of international law.”231 Despite the centrality of POD in international
theory, it is rarely invoked, and even more rarely successfully invoked, because of
the nearly impossible criteria it requires.232 As legal sources have not yet
determined what behavior constitutes a contradiction to an objection, thus
preventing a state from receiving PO status, it is common to find false
identifications of PO contradictions, as there is no accepted standard for the
identification of PO contradictions.
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For POD to come into expression and to be more than a dead letter in the
international law canon, the term “contradiction” must be rethought. While legal
scholarship has engaged with the positive requirements for POD, such as
persistency and consistency, the Achilles heel of POD is actually the point at
which a state lapses out of PO status—the moment that it contradicts its
objection. In the absence of any clear definition of what behavior constitutes a
contradiction (which consequently disqualifies the state from PO status), it seems
that contradictions are defined too broadly, making it almost unrealistic to
successfully invoke POD.
Therefore, the following considerations should be taken into account when
assessing whether a state has contradicted its objection to an emerging rule of CIL:
First, the behavior in question must logically contradict the objection to
constitute a contradiction. The substance of the objection must be understood––
specifically, it must be determined whether the state argues that the rule in
question never applies or that it has discretion to decide whether it applies. Then, it
must be assessed whether the objection is indeed in contradiction with the
behavior in question.
Second, it is necessary to consider that an understanding of POD that
radicalizes a state’s position is against international interests. POD should be
understood to require states to honestly reflect their objections. An overly easy
identification of contradictions might push states to radicalize their stances to
maintain a PO status. A reading of POD as requiring states to purchase weapons
or to veto important decisions is against the interest of the international
community. Therefore, and especially in the case of contradictions by omission,
such omissions should not be identified as contradictions.
Third, one needs to consider whether the behavior in question reflects the
position of the state. In modern democracies, wherein the state is represented
through a plurality of voices, it is necessary to separate statements that represent
the state’s stance from those that do not.
Fourth, the identification of contradictions should be performed carefully and
with integrity. Contradictions should not be identified carelessly, simply to achieve
the desired conclusion of obliging the relevant state in a rule of CIL. While the
temptation to declare a rule of CIL as obliging all states is significant, POD should
not be manipulated for such purposes.
PO status should not be easily maintained – but rather, PO status should be
realistically possible to maintain. POD has a role to play in international law. It reduces
risks of CIL violation, supports CIL development and enhances CIL's legitimacy.
For POD to be able to fulfil its purpose it needs to be revived, and the term
“contradiction” needs to be rethought and reconstructed. If such transformation
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would take place, then Stein's prediction the POD will find more expression in
modern international law233 may still be proven correct.
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